Best for
- SOC engineers need to create detection rules portable across multiple SIEM platforms
- Threat intelligence reports describe TTPs requiring new detection coverage
- Existing vendor-specific rules need standardization into a shareable format
adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/cursor-claude-codex/skills/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/building-detection-rules-with-sigma/SKILL.md
Builds vendor-agnostic detection rules using the Sigma rule format for threat detection across SIEM platforms including Splunk, Elastic, and Microsoft Sentinel. Use when creating portable detection logic from threat intelligence, mapping rules to MITRE ATT&CK techniques, or converting community Sigma rules into platform-specific queries using sigmac or pySigma backends.
Decision brief
Builds vendor-agnostic detection rules using the Sigma rule format for threat detection across SIEM platforms including Splunk, Elastic, and Microsoft Sentinel.
Compatibility matrix
| Platform | Status | Evidence | What to check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Codex | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Claude Code | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Cursor | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Gemini CLI | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
Installation
The source command is displayed only when detected. A safe inspection prompt is always available so your agent can explain every action before execution.
npx skills add https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai --skill "cursor-claude-codex/skills/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/building-detection-rules-with-sigma"Inspect the Agent Skill "building-detection-rules-with-sigma" from https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/blob/7f71af8164e8f5a775253417aa405b5d9d063faf/cursor-claude-codex/skills/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/building-detection-rules-with-sigma/SKILL.md at commit 7f71af8164e8f5a775253417aa405b5d9d063faf. List every install step, command, network request, credential, file read/write, external action, and rollback step. Explain whether it fits my task. Do not install or execute anything until I approve.
Workflow
Start with a threat report or ATT&CK technique. Example: detecting Mimikatz credential dumping (T1003.001 — LSASS Memory):
Start with a threat report or ATT&CK technique. Example: detecting Mimikatz credential dumping (T1003.001 — LSASS Memory):
Use sigma check to validate the rule:
Convert to Elastic Query (Lucene):
Tag every rule with ATT&CK technique IDs in the tags field:
Permission review
The documentation includes network, browsing, or remote request actions.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/The documentation includes network, browsing, or remote request actions.
https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatzEvidence record
| Signal | Value | Evidence type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quality score | 91/100 | Computed | Documentation, specificity, maintenance, and trust rules |
| Repository stars | 51 | Source | Repository attention, not individual Skill quality |
| Compatibility | 0 platforms | Source | Declared in the catalog source record |
| Usage guide | automated source guide | Editorial | Generated or reviewed according to the visible evidence level |
Pinned source
Use this skill when:
Do not use for real-time streaming detection (Sigma is for batch/scheduled searches) or when the target SIEM has native detection features that Sigma cannot express (e.g., Splunk RBA risk scoring).
pySigma and appropriate backend (pySigma-backend-splunk, pySigma-backend-elasticsearch, pySigma-backend-microsoft365defender)git clone https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma.gitStart with a threat report or ATT&CK technique. Example: detecting Mimikatz credential dumping (T1003.001 — LSASS Memory):
title: Mimikatz Credential Dumping via LSASS Access
id: 0d894093-71bc-43c3-8d63-bf520e73a7c5
status: stable
level: high
description: Detects process accessing lsass.exe memory, indicative of credential dumping tools like Mimikatz
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
author: mahipal
date: 2024/03/15
modified: 2024/03/15
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
GrantedAccess|contains:
- '0x1010'
- '0x1038'
- '0x1fffff'
- '0x40'
filter_main_svchost:
SourceImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
filter_main_csrss:
SourceImage|endswith: '\csrss.exe'
filter_main_wininit:
SourceImage|endswith: '\wininit.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate security tools accessing LSASS
- Windows Defender scanning
- CrowdStrike Falcon sensor
Use sigma check to validate the rule:
# Install pySigma and validators
pip install pySigma pySigma-validators-sigmaHQ
# Validate rule
sigma check rule.yml
Alternatively, validate with Python:
from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
from sigma.validators.core import SigmaValidator
rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open("rule.yml").read())
validator = SigmaValidator()
issues = validator.validate_rule(rule)
for issue in issues:
print(f"{issue.severity}: {issue.message}")
Convert to Splunk SPL:
from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
from sigma.backends.splunk import SplunkBackend
from sigma.pipelines.splunk import splunk_windows_pipeline
pipeline = splunk_windows_pipeline()
backend = SplunkBackend(pipeline)
rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open("rule.yml").read())
splunk_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(splunk_query[0])
Output:
TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe" (GrantedAccess="*0x1010*" OR GrantedAccess="*0x1038*"
OR GrantedAccess="*0x1fffff*" OR GrantedAccess="*0x40*")
NOT (SourceImage="*\\svchost.exe") NOT (SourceImage="*\\csrss.exe")
NOT (SourceImage="*\\wininit.exe")
Convert to Elastic Query (Lucene):
from sigma.backends.elasticsearch import LuceneBackend
from sigma.pipelines.elasticsearch import ecs_windows_pipeline
pipeline = ecs_windows_pipeline()
backend = LuceneBackend(pipeline)
elastic_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(elastic_query[0])
Convert to Microsoft Sentinel KQL:
from sigma.backends.microsoft365defender import Microsoft365DefenderBackend
backend = Microsoft365DefenderBackend()
kql_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(kql_query[0])
Tag every rule with ATT&CK technique IDs in the tags field:
tags:
- attack.credential_access # Tactic
- attack.t1003.001 # Sub-technique
- attack.t1003 # Parent technique
Track detection coverage using the ATT&CK Navigator:
import json
# Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer from Sigma rules
layer = {
"name": "SOC Detection Coverage",
"versions": {"attack": "14", "navigator": "4.9", "layer": "4.5"},
"domain": "enterprise-attack",
"techniques": []
}
# Parse Sigma rules directory for technique tags
import os
from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
for root, dirs, files in os.walk("sigma/rules/windows/"):
for f in files:
if f.endswith(".yml"):
rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open(os.path.join(root, f)).read())
for tag in rule.tags:
if str(tag).startswith("attack.t"):
technique_id = str(tag).replace("attack.", "").upper()
layer["techniques"].append({
"techniqueID": technique_id,
"color": "#31a354",
"score": 1
})
with open("coverage_layer.json", "w") as f:
json.dump(layer, f, indent=2)
Create test data and validate the rule catches the expected events:
# Use sigma test framework
sigma test rule.yml --target splunk --pipeline splunk_windows
# Or manually test in Splunk with sample data
# Upload Sysmon process_access log with known Mimikatz signature
Validate false positive rate by running against 7 days of production data in a non-alerting saved search.
Deploy the converted query as a scheduled search or correlation rule:
Splunk ES Correlation Search:
| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process_name="*\\lsass.exe"
by Processes.src, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| where count > 0
Elastic Security Rule (TOML format):
[rule]
name = "LSASS Memory Access - Credential Dumping"
description = "Detects suspicious access to LSASS process memory"
risk_score = 73
severity = "high"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.action == "access" and
process.name == "lsass.exe" and
not process.executable : ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\csrss.exe")
'''
[rule.threat]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
Store rules in Git with automated testing:
# .github/workflows/sigma-ci.yml
name: Sigma Rule CI
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
validate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: '3.11'
- run: pip install pySigma pySigma-validators-sigmaHQ
- run: sigma check rules/
- run: sigma convert -t splunk -p splunk_windows rules/ > /dev/null
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Sigma | Vendor-agnostic detection rule format (YAML-based) that compiles to SIEM-specific queries via backends |
| pySigma | Python library replacing legacy sigmac for rule conversion, validation, and pipeline processing |
| Backend | pySigma plugin that translates Sigma detection logic into a target platform query language (SPL, KQL, Lucene) |
| Pipeline | Field mapping configuration that translates generic Sigma field names to SIEM-specific field names |
| Logsource | Sigma rule section defining the category (process_creation, network_connection) and product (windows, linux) of the target data |
| Detection-as-Code | Practice of managing detection rules in version control with CI/CD testing and automated deployment |
SIGMA RULE DEPLOYMENT REPORT
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Rule ID: 0d894093-71bc-43c3-8d63-bf520e73a7c5
Title: Mimikatz Credential Dumping via LSASS Access
ATT&CK: T1003.001 - LSASS Memory
Severity: High
Status: Deployed to Production
Conversions:
Splunk SPL: PASS — Saved search "sigma_lsass_access" created
Elastic EQL: PASS — Detection rule ID elastic-0d894093 enabled
Sentinel KQL: PASS — Analytics rule deployed via ARM template
Testing:
True Positives: 4/4 test cases matched
False Positives: 2 in 7-day backtest (svchost edge case — filter added)
Performance: Avg execution 3.2s on 50M events/day
Frequently asked questions
Builds vendor-agnostic detection rules using the Sigma rule format for threat detection across SIEM platforms including Splunk, Elastic, and Microsoft Sentinel.
The source record exposes this install command: npx skills add https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai --skill "cursor-claude-codex/skills/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/skills/building-detection-rules-with-sigma". Inspect the command and pinned source before running it.
Static rules flagged network in the source; the page lists the matching lines and excerpts.
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