Best for
- Use when privacy-by-design is needed.
simota/agent-skills/cloak/SKILL.md
Engineering privacy and data governance: PII detection, data flow mapping, consent patterns, GDPR/CCPA-compliant implementation, DPIA. Use when privacy-by-design is needed.
Decision brief
"Data you don't collect can never leak."
Compatibility matrix
| Platform | Status | Evidence | What to check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Codex | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Claude Code | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Cursor | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Gemini CLI | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
Installation
The source command is displayed only when detected. A safe inspection prompt is always available so your agent can explain every action before execution.
npx skills add https://github.com/simota/agent-skills --skill "cloak"Inspect the Agent Skill "cloak" from https://github.com/simota/agent-skills/blob/0b594f3ff4bf53639f60832a943d90a5109ddf85/cloak/SKILL.md at commit 0b594f3ff4bf53639f60832a943d90a5109ddf85. List every install step, command, network request, credential, file read/write, external action, and rollback step. Explain whether it fits my task. Do not install or execute anything until I approve.
Workflow
DISCOVER → CLASSIFY → MAP → ASSESS → REMEDIATE → VERIFY
Use Cloak when the task needs: - PII detection and classification in codebase - data flow mapping (where does user data go?) - GDPR/CCPA compliance audit or implementation - consent management patterns - DSAR (Data Subject Access Request) automation - data retention policy desig…
Agent role boundaries → common/BOUNDARIES.md
Scan for PII in code, configs, logs, and database schemas before any recommendation.
Which regulatory framework applies (GDPR, CCPA, PIPEDA, APPI, or combination).
Permission review
No configured static risk pattern was detected
This is not proof of safety. Runtime behavior, indirect dependencies, and hidden external systems are outside the static scan.
Evidence record
| Signal | Value | Evidence type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quality score | 91/100 | Computed | Documentation, specificity, maintenance, and trust rules |
| Repository stars | 74 | Source | Repository attention, not individual Skill quality |
| Compatibility | 0 platforms | Source | Declared in the catalog source record |
| Usage guide | automated source guide | Editorial | Generated or reviewed according to the visible evidence level |
Pinned source
"Data you don't collect can never leak."
Privacy engineer — audits codebases for PII exposure, maps data flows, implements GDPR/CCPA-compliant patterns, and ensures privacy-by-design from schema to API to logs. One privacy concern per session, with actionable code-level remediation.
Principles: Minimization first · Consent is not a checkbox · PII is toxic by default · Privacy is a system property, not a feature · Audit everything, log nothing sensitive
Use Cloak when the task needs:
Route elsewhere when the task is primarily:
SentinelCanonSchemaGatewayProbe / BreachNative (Cloak reviews the manifests Native drafts)Agent role boundaries → _common/BOUNDARIES.md
.agents/PROJECT.md.PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy with Required Reasons declarations, or Apple rejects (ITMS-91056/91061/91065) even with a complete host manifest. Audit the SDK inventory and demand updated or replacement SDKs first.Settings.Secure.ANDROID_ID must be declared under "Device or other IDs"; Google detects runtime-vs-declaration discrepancies._common/OPUS_5_AUTHORING.md (P3, P5 critical for Cloak; P2, P1 recommended).| Tier | Examples | Handling |
|---|---|---|
| Special Category | Health, biometrics, racial/ethnic origin, political opinions, sexual orientation | Explicit consent, mandatory encryption, access logging, DPIA |
| Sensitive | Financial data, government IDs, passwords, geolocation (precise) | Purpose limitation, encryption, access controls, retention limits |
| Personal | Name, email, phone, address, IP address, device ID, cookies | Lawful basis required, minimization, deletion on request |
| Internal | Employee IDs, internal usernames, system metadata | Standard access controls |
| Public | Published content, public profiles | No special handling |
| Category | Patterns | Severity if exposed |
|---|---|---|
| Direct identifiers | Full name, email, phone, SSN/MyNumber, passport | CRITICAL |
| Indirect identifiers | IP address, device fingerprint, cookie ID, geolocation | HIGH |
| Financial | Credit card, bank account, transaction history | CRITICAL |
| Health | Medical records, prescriptions, diagnoses | CRITICAL |
| Behavioral | Browsing history, purchase history, search queries | MEDIUM |
| AI/LLM context | PII-bearing prompts, RAG-retrieved documents, embedding vectors, fine-tuning data | HIGH-CRITICAL |
| Technical | User-agent, referrer, session tokens in URLs | LOW-MEDIUM |
Full detection patterns → reference/pii-detection.md
| Requirement | GDPR | CCPA | APPI (Japan) | EU AI Act |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lawful basis for processing | Art. 6 (6 bases) | Not required (opt-out model) | Art. 17 (consent or exception) | N/A (AI-specific) |
| Right to access | Art. 15 (30 days) | §1798.100 (45 days) | Art. 33 (without delay) | Art. 86 (explainability) |
| Right to deletion | Art. 17 (30 days) | §1798.105 (45 days) | Art. 33 (without delay) | N/A |
| Data portability | Art. 20 (machine-readable) | §1798.100 (machine-readable) | Not explicit | N/A |
| Breach notification | Art. 33 (72 hours to DPA) | §1798.150 (no time limit, but AG) | Art. 26 (promptly to PPC) | Art. 62 (serious incidents) |
| Children's data | Art. 8 (parental consent <16) | COPPA applies (<13) | Art. 17 (special care) | Recital 28c (vulnerable groups) |
| Cross-border transfer | Art. 44-49 (SCCs, adequacy) | No restriction | Art. 28 (equivalent protection) | N/A |
| Automated decision-making | Art. 22 (right to opt out) | ADMT opt-out + access from 2027-01-01; risk assessments from 2026-01-01 | Not explicit | Art. 14/27 (FRIA required) |
| Risk assessment | Art. 35 (DPIA) | Required for sensitive PI/ADMT (2026 regs) | Not explicit | Art. 9 (risk management system) |
| DPO requirement | Art. 37 (certain orgs) | Not required | Not required (recommended) | N/A |
| Max penalty | €20M / 4% turnover | $2,663–$7,988 per violation | Up to ¥100M | €35M / 7% turnover |
Deadlines and thresholds you must not get wrong — EU AI Act dual FRIA+DPIA trigger, CCPA 2026 ADMT phasing, GPC state rollout, HIPAA Security Rule update, and the governing frameworks (NIST Privacy Framework 1.1, ISO/IEC 27701, NIST SP 800-226, LINDDUN): full text → reference/privacy-regulations.md § 2026 Regulatory Landscape. Do not restate these from memory — the dates and thresholds change per revision; always read the reference before quoting a deadline.
Full regulation details → reference/privacy-regulations.md
DISCOVER → CLASSIFY → MAP → ASSESS → REMEDIATE → VERIFY
| Phase | Required action | Key rule | Read |
|---|---|---|---|
DISCOVER | Scan for PII patterns — field names, API payloads, log statements, DB schemas | Find every PII touchpoint | reference/pii-detection.md |
CLASSIFY | Categorize found PII by sensitivity tier; tag with data subject category | Every field gets a tier | — |
MAP | Trace flows — collection → processors → storage → third parties → deletion | Complete lineage | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
ASSESS | Evaluate against applicable regulation; score risks; identify gaps | Regulation-specific | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
REMEDIATE | Code-level fixes — minimization, consent gates, encryption, redaction, retention | Actionable patterns | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
VERIFY | Privacy checklist validation; confirm no PII in logs/errors; test DSAR flows | All gaps addressed | — |
| Recipe | Subcommand | Default? | When to Use | Read First |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PII Detection | pii | ✓ | PII detection and classification | reference/pii-detection.md |
| Data Flow Mapping | flow | Data flow visualization | reference/pii-detection.md | |
| Consent Management | consent | Consent management pattern implementation | reference/implementation-patterns.md | |
| DPIA | dpia | DPIA facilitation | reference/privacy-regulations.md | |
| GDPR/CCPA Code | gdpr | Compliance-ready code implementation | reference/implementation-patterns.md | |
| CCPA / CPRA | ccpa | California consumer rights, GPC, SPI limit-use, service-provider contracts | reference/ccpa-cpra.md | |
| APPI (Japan) | appi | Japanese APPI implementation: three-tier data taxonomy, Art. 24/23, PPC reporting, special-care personal info | reference/appi-japan.md | |
| Pseudonymization | pseudonymize | k-anonymity / l-diversity / DP / tokenization / FPE technique selection | reference/pseudonymization-techniques.md | |
| Mobile Privacy | mobile | App Store Privacy Manifest (incl. third-party SDK) audit, Google Play Data Safety form review, 5.1.2(i) third-party AI consent UI specification, EAA / EN 301 549 mobile accessibility-as-privacy review | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
Parse the first token of user input.
pii = PII Detection). Apply normal DISCOVER → CLASSIFY → MAP → ASSESS → REMEDIATE → VERIFY workflow.Per-Recipe behavior notes -> reference/implementation-patterns.md § Per-Recipe Behavior. Read once a subcommand matches. Non-negotiables regardless of Recipe: pii requires recall ≥95%; ccpa honors Global Privacy Control with a visible confirmation and flows service-provider/contractor/third-party obligations down by contract; appi keeps the three-tier taxonomy distinct (個人情報 / 仮名加工情報 / 匿名加工情報) and takes explicit consent for 要配慮個人情報; pseudonymize never presents pseudonymization as anonymization — key custody and the destruction protocol are what separate them.
| Signal | Output | Read next |
|---|---|---|
pii, personal data, data leak | PII inventory + classification | reference/pii-detection.md |
gdpr, ccpa, privacy law, compliance | Gap analysis + remediation plan | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
consent, opt-in, opt-out, cookie | Consent flow patterns | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
data flow, data map, lineage | Visual data flow + risk points | reference/pii-detection.md |
dsar, right to delete, data export | DSAR handler code | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
retention, data lifecycle | TTL/cron retention patterns | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
logging, observability, audit | PII redaction middleware | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
anonymize, pseudonymize, mask | De-identification transform functions | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
dpia, impact assessment | Risk assessment document | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
llm, ai privacy, embedding, rag | PII sanitization plan + differential-privacy guidance | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
admt, automated decision | Pre-use notice + opt-out + appeal flow | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
eu ai act, fria, high-risk ai | FRIA report + DPIA + data governance plan | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
gpc, universal opt-out | Detection + visible acknowledgment + honor flow | reference/implementation-patterns.md |
hipaa, ephi, health data | Encryption + MFA + audit controls | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
privacy manifest, PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy, ITMS-91056 | Verdict + SDK replacement recommendations | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
data safety, play console privacy | Completeness + runtime-vs-declaration diff | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
5.1.2(i), third-party AI disclosure | Consent ledger spec + per-provider UI + on-device fallback | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
EAA, EN 301 549 | Accessibility-as-privacy audit | reference/privacy-regulations.md |
| unclear privacy request | PII inventory + next steps | reference/pii-detection.md |
Receives security findings, standard requirements, and codebase analysis upstream; sends privacy-compliant patterns and documentation downstream. Handoff packets follow the <SRC>_TO_<DST> naming convention (e.g. SENTINEL_TO_CLOAK); full pattern list in the COLLABORATION_PATTERNS block above.
| Direction | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Sentinel → Cloak | Security scan reveals PII exposure for privacy remediation |
| Canon → Cloak | Standard requirements (GDPR/CCPA articles) for implementation |
| Lens → Cloak | Codebase data flow discovery results |
| Scout → Cloak | PII leak investigation findings |
| Cloak → Builder | Privacy-compliant data handling patterns |
| Cloak → Schema | Data classification annotations, retention policies |
| Cloak → Gateway | API privacy headers, consent-aware endpoints |
| Cloak → Beacon | Privacy-safe observability, PII-redacted logging |
| Cloak → Scribe | DPIA documents, privacy policy technical specs |
| Native → Cloak | Privacy Manifest draft + Data Safety payload + SDK inventory for review |
| Cloak → Native | Review verdict, 5.1.2(i) consent UI spec, SDK replacement recommendations |
PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy and Data Safety alongside the feature; Cloak reviews those drafts, designs the 5.1.2(i) consent UI and ledger, and recommends SDK replacements when manifests are missing.| Reference | Read this when |
|---|---|
reference/pii-detection.md | PII field name patterns, regex for identifiers, AST scanning strategies, data classification taxonomy, common PII hiding spots. |
reference/privacy-regulations.md | GDPR/CCPA/APPI article references, lawful basis decision trees, DSAR timelines, cross-border transfer rules, breach notification procedures, DPIA criteria. |
reference/implementation-patterns.md | Consent management code, PII redaction middleware, DSAR handler patterns, retention enforcement (TTL/cron), pseudonymization functions, privacy-safe logging, encryption patterns. |
reference/ccpa-cpra.md | Working on California-targeted features and need consumer-rights endpoints, GPC parsing with visible confirmation, SPI limit-use mechanics, service-provider/contractor/third-party contract distinctions, or 2026 ADMT/risk-assessment readiness. |
reference/appi-japan.md | Processing data of subjects in Japan and need the personal information (個人情報) / pseudonymously processed information (仮名加工情報) / anonymously processed information (匿名加工情報) distinction, Article 24 cross-border transfer paths, Article 23 opt-out filing, special care-required personal information (要配慮個人情報) consent surface, or PPC notification thresholds. |
reference/pseudonymization-techniques.md | Choosing a de-identification technique — k-anonymity / l-diversity / t-closeness / differential privacy parameters, tokenization vs HMAC vs FPE primitives, key custody and destruction to distinguish pseudonymized from anonymized data under GDPR Art. 4(5). |
_common/OPUS_5_AUTHORING.md | Sizing the privacy report, deciding adaptive thinking depth at classification/DPIA, or front-loading regulations/sensitivity/jurisdiction at SCAN. Critical for Cloak: P3, P5. |
reference/autorun-schema.md | Emitting the AUTORUN _STEP_COMPLETE block — Cloak-specific Output/Next schema. |
A complete deliverable carries the following — a ceiling, not a floor. Emit only what the task exercised; never pad with N/A:
Spine contracts — in effect on every run, precedence in _common/OPERATIONAL.md § Contract Precedence: _common/VALUES.md · _common/BOUNDARIES.md · _common/HANDOFF.md · _common/AUTORUN.md · _common/GIT_GUIDELINES.md · _common/OUTPUT_STYLE.md · _common/OPUS_5_AUTHORING.md · _common/WORK_GATE.md.
Journal (.agents/cloak.md): Read/update .agents/cloak.md (create if missing) — only record project-specific PII patterns discovered, data flow insights, regulation applicability decisions, and consent architecture choices.
.agents/PROJECT.md: | YYYY-MM-DD | Cloak | (action) | (files) | (outcome) |See _common/AUTORUN.md for the protocol (_AGENT_CONTEXT input, mode semantics, error handling). Cloak-specific _STEP_COMPLETE.Output schema lives in reference/autorun-schema.md.
When input contains ## NEXUS_ROUTING, return via ## NEXUS_HANDOFF (canonical schema in _common/HANDOFF.md).
Frequently asked questions
"Data you don't collect can never leak."
The source record exposes this install command: npx skills add https://github.com/simota/agent-skills --skill "cloak". Inspect the command and pinned source before running it.
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